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The law of domicil is a subject which, to the everyday prac-
titioner, presents some terror. This is not due to the fact that
the legal rules relating to the nature and ascertainment of dom-
icil are more complex, obscure or difficult of application than
those relating to other legal subjects, but rather because domicil
is a matter which does not very frequently come to the atten-
tion of the average lawyer. It, therefore, appears to be in-
volved in that mystery which always enshrouds the unknown,
and the mystery is, consciously or unconsciously, enhanced by
the Latinized phraseology in which the few adepts have involved
the subject.
Domicil has recently met with the fullest discussion in the
American Law Institute. It has been the subject of a complete
report:, by Professor Joseph H. Beale, of Harvard, the great
master on the subject of the Conflict of Laws, and his Committee
of Advisers to the Institute, and has been fully canvassed in
public session. To endeavor, therefore, to discuss the matter
de novo or to attempt upon any large scale a criticism of this
admirable work would savor strongly of that temerity and valor
which can be founded upon ignorance alone.
I make no pretense to any part of that vast erudition possessed
by Professor Beale and many of his learned advisers on the sub-
ject of the Conflict of Laws. They have examined with minute
circumspection all the English and American precedents bear-
ing upon the question of domicil and jurisdiction and have sum-
marized those precedents in carefully drawn propositions which
are intended to embody the whole of the common law learning
and precedent upon the subject. I can, therefore, only speak as
one of the average practitioners who from time to time has been
forced to wrestle with questions of the Conflict of Laws, both as
between the states of the Union and as between a state and some
foreign nation. I shall, therefore, confine my discussion mainly
to some of the practical problems that have confronted me and
the manner in which they have been dealt with by the courts
of New York.
As Professor Beale well says: -
"Domicil is a subject of importance in our law because a con-
1 (1925) THE AimRECAN LAW INSTITuTE, CONFLICT OF LAWS REsT,TE-
LENT No. 1, §§ 10-42.
2 Ibid. Treatise No. 1, at 3.
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siderable number of jural relations are determined by the law
of the domicil of the person concerned."
This is, indeed, true, since the law envisages every individual
at birth as having a domicil. Domicil regulates the most im-
portant affairs of his life-the validity of divorce, the legitimacy
of children, the imposition of taxes, and the devolution of per-
sonal property, whether by will or through intestacy. For this
reason, confusion and vagueness in the rules of law may lead
to financial loss, family unhappiness and various social ills.
As the world through modern methods of communication
grows smaller and as men are more easily shifting their homes,
the practical difficulties surrounding the matter dealt with be-
come greater and call more and more for as much legal precision
in ascertaining domicil as may be possible.
Underlying the whole law of domicil is, of course, the con-
ception of the necessity for a single law to determine relation-
ships. Status, capacity, the validity of wills, if differently de-
termined in regard to the same person by all the nations of the
world, or even by the forty-eight states of the Union, would lead
to a condition of complete legal anarchy.
After the break-up of the Roman Empire, under whose rule
the world had been almost a legal unit, jurists sought for some
method of polarizing law, or of finding some Pole Star by which
to determine what rules should govern the individual as to his
property or status.
In the so-called Dark Ages each individual
"was subject to the law of the particular ethnic group to which
he belonged, and all his proprietary rights were determined by
that law. But gradually there grew up in the different towns
and provinces certain fixed customs and rules affecting all
property within the locality, which were known as 'statutes.'" U
These statutes came to be distinguished as real statutes or
personal statutes, as they dealt with things or with persons, and
a body of doctrine was built up designed to determine whether
the statutes to be applied in specific cases were real or personal.
As to land, the feudal conception of law as strictly territorial
remained supreme, but as to succession and movables, there grew
up a doctrine of so-called comity by which the succession was
determined by the law of the country or place where the dece-
dent had his last domicil. Before the eighteenth century, with
the rise of the great national states, the conception of domicil
as the Pole Star for the determination of questions relating to
personal property was generally prevalent in Europe. Since
then, howevek, and especially during the nineteenth century
3 BENTWICH, DOMICILE AND SUCCESSION (1911) 1-2.
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Western Europe, domicil as the criterion has been replaced by
nationality, and upon it the States of Europe, such as France,
Italy and Germany, base their international private law. The
nationality of a person is deemed to follow him as regards all
the major concerns of life-the validity of his marriage, his
capacity to contract, his legitimacy, his divorce and the regula-
tion of his succession, are all matters to be determined by the
national law.
In Great Britain and the Dominions, the common law still
prevails and domicil is, and must be, as it is in the United States,
the criterion, because of the many systems of law which exist
under the British flag.
The term "residence" is not synonymous with domicil and
wherever it appears in statutes or decisions its meaning must be
determined. luch confusion arises in the reading of the cases
through the using of residence in a double sense, sometimes as
meaning true domicil and at other times as meaning mere resi-
dence. In the latter sense, i.e., the general meaning of the
word, it indicates any place or dwelling of more or less perma-
nence. It is, in fact, anything more than a place of temporary
sojourn. In some statutes, residence is given a definition malting
it identical with domicil. In other statutes, staying for a fixed
pe~iod of time in a place will be construed as a residence. A
most frequent use of residence is in connection with the acquisi-
tion of jurisdiction, as in cases of attachment. In cases of di-
vorce, the word residence would at common law be synonymous
with domicil. In the New York statutes, residence is frequently
used where domicil is intended, and also in its own proper sense
in matters connected with voting, naturalization, attachment,
security for costs, arrest for debt, etc.
Owing to the conflicts arising between the common law cri-
terion of domicil and that of the civil law of nationality, there
have arisen many interesting and difficult cases. A by-product
of this conflict is the famous doctrine of renvoi. I do not mean
here to more than indicate the nature of that troublesome prob-
lem. Its discussion has already formed the subject-matter of
volumes.
A is an American domiciled in France, leaving property both
there and in the state of New York. His succession is opened in
New York either by the appointment of an administrator or the
probate of a will. The New York law says that devolution of
his property, testate or intestate, is determinable by the law of
his domicil, and refers the matter to the French law. The
French courts hold that it is determinable by the law of his na-
tionality, which is American, and refer the question back to the
law of New York, as that of his nationality. The New York
court might, of course, refer the matter back to the French law
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after the development and unification of the great nations of
and the legal lawn tennis might go on forever. If New York,
however, accepted renvoi it would apply its domestic law not as
such but because the French law of the domicil so required, an
absurd result; in other words, it would decide as the French
court would do. In practice, however, the New York court in
such a case will apply the French internal or domestic law on
the theory that when its statutes referred to the law of domicil
they referred to the territorial law there applying to particular
situations, and not the rule of international private law for deter-
mining questions of conflict. This seems to me to be the sensible
view to take and it has finally been sanctioned by the New York
courts in the case of In Matter of Tallmadge.4
The case was remarkable in that the surrogate acted upon a
most scholarly and exhaustive opinion by that late distinguished
member of the New York Bar, Mr. Egerton L. Winthrop, Jr.
Mr. Winthrop discussed very fully the doctrine of renvoi in its
various stages and was aided by experts on foreign law, as well
as by the very able counsel. The first question in the case was
whether the decedent had a bona fide domicil in France. His
parents had lived there for so many years that there was a ques-
tion whether they had not lost their domicil of origin. He had
spent his whole life in France with no evidence of intent to re-
turn to the United States and, short of naturalization, could have
done little more to establish a permanent home in France. The
referee, therefore, very properly determined his domicil to be
France.
The important question then arose whether the French law
or New York law should apply to certain legacies; by the French
law they had lapsed; by the New York law they were valid. The
French court would have applied the renvoi doctrine and deter-
mined the question by New York law. Was the New York court
also to apply that doctrine and decide according to the New
York law, or was it to hold that the law to be applied was the
internal or territorial law of France which would invalidate
the legacies? The referee determined that the latter was the
correct view and applied the French law applicable to lapsed
legacies.
The New York statute, which is declaratory of the common
law, regulates the disposition of a decedent's property "by the
laws of the state or country, of which the decedent was a resi-
dent, at the time of his death." This the referee construed to
mean the actual territorial law of such foreign state and not
the rule which the courts of that state applied to the Conflict of
4 109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336 (Surr. 1919). This was the report
of a referee, confirmed by the Surrogate's Court.
5 Decedent Estate Law, § 47.
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Laws. In other words, the New York statute intended to refer
to the internal or domestic law of the foreign state and not to
the rules or doctrines of international private law propounded
by the courts. This opinion is one of the most interesting to be
found in the books on any question of Conflict of Laws and it
is regrettable that the case did not go to the Court of Appeals.
The referee concluded his opinion as follows: 0
"There is thus no authority which compels me to apply the
'renvoi' doctrine to the case at bar. The way is unmarked in
this state and should be determined in accordance with sound
legal principles. On account of its inconsistency with common-
law theories of the conflict of laws, its fundamental unsoundness
and the chaos which would result from its application to the
confficts arising between the laws of the states of this country,
it is my opinion that the 'renvoi' has no place in our juris-
prudence."
I have little doubt that the reasoning of this admirable opinion
represents the law of New York, and that when the question is
presented to the Court of Appeals it will be resolved in precisely
the same fashion. The renvoi doctrine is a resultant of legal
casuistry and over-subtlety. It is a doctrine over-complicated,
unsound and revolutionary.
The whole renvoi doctrine has been admirably discussed by an
English practitioner, Mr. Pawley Bate, in an exhaustive mono-
graph.7  He concludes as did the court in the Talbizedge case.
Norman Bentwich, however, takes a different view and strongly
advocates renvoi, although he admits that it is still a matter of
great controversy. He gives an excellent statement of it as
follows: 8
"For example, if today an Englishman dies domiciled by Eng-
lish law in Italy, and leaves personal property in Italy which
is not disposed of by any wifll, an English court having jurisdic-
tion over the estate will first of all have to consider the law
which is to be applied to the distribution of the personalty, and
will choose the Italian law. But it will have to take account of
the fact that the Italian law contains a rule by which the per-
sonal property of a foreign resident is distributable according
to the law of his nationality, and therefore it has to determine
whether that principle of the Italian law is to be applied, or the
English rule as to the personal law to be treated as dominant.
i . . In order to surmount the difficulty caused by the existence
of varying principles of private national law in England and
Continental countries our Courts [English courts] have tended
to accept the reference back to our internal law made by the law
of the foreign domicile."
6 109 Misc. at 715, 181 N. Y. Supp. at 348.
7 BATE, NOTES ON THE DOCTRINE OF RENVoI (1904).
8 BENTWICH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 30.
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It may be said that the system which is based upon domicil is
freer, more elastic and more compatible with the ideas and tra-
ditions of the English-speaking people than that which is based
upon nationality. One may with reasonable ease change one's
domicil. A change of nationality is a much more difficult, serious
and important thing.
Those nations which insist upon nationality thereby assert the
power of the national state to control all legal relationships of
the individual wherever he goes. It is not my purpose here to
speak further of the Conflict of Laws in Europe. As between
the civil law states there has grown up a large body of treaty
law covering private relationships. This has served to mitigate
many of the difficulties by giving full judicial recognition in one
nation to the judicial acts, decrees or sentences of another.
Neither England nor America having been a party to any such
treaties, the common law remains unmodified by treaty pro-
visions.
Domicil has been defined in various ways but I quite agree
with Professor Beale that the underlying concept of domicil is
that of home. Where one has one's fixed home or habitat, there
is one's domicil. This is the ordinary case of the normal indi-
vidual and leads to little difficulty. The difficulties arise where
the home is uncertain or in the case of compelled or construc-
tive domicil, that is,'in according a domicil to persons who
either have no home or, because of their legally incompetent
condition, are unable to choose one.
Domicil may well be said to be the place with which a per-
son has a settled connection for legal purposes; either because
his home is there or because it is assigned to him by law.
There are several definitions and criteria of domicil, mainly
taken from the English cases, which have been adopted by
New York law. One of the most interesting and far-reaching
discussions of the law of domicil is to be found in the case
of Dupuy v. Wurtz.9 The question there arose over the validity
of a will of personal property made by a testatrix, originally
domiciled in New York, who went abroad in 1859 on account
of her health, and remained abroad until her death in 1871.
The opinion was written by Judge Rapallo, a jurist of wide re-
pute, great learning and legal acumen. He laid down the ele-
mentary rule for the ascertainment of domicil: 20
"One leading rule is that for the purposes of succession every
person must have a domicil somewhere, and can have but one
domicil, and that the domicil of origin is presumed to continue
until a new one is acquired. . ..
"To effect a change of domicil for the purpose of succession
9 53 N. Y. 556 (1853).
10 Ibid. 561.
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there must be not only a change of residence, but an intention
to abandon the former domicil, and acquire another as the sole
domicil. There must be both residence in the alleged adopted
domicil and intention to adopt such place of residence as the
sole domicil."
The court admitted that the question was one of considerable
difficulty and particularly stressed the fact that she was abroad
for her health and had no desire to adopt another system of
law:
"The present is one of the exceptional cases in which the
duty devolves upon this court to pass upon the facts as well
as the law. And we think that the conclusion of fact, fairly to
be drawn from all the evidence, is that the testatrix, after hav-
ing long and consistently entertained the intention of returning,
had finaly become satisfied that the state of her health anld
nerves was such that she wozdd be vzable to return to hcr home,
and wozld, in all probability, die abroad. At the same time it
establishes no intention to adopt a, foreign domicil, but that she
desired azd claimed to retain her domicit of origi, anzd to have
her estate administered accordizg to the laws of the State of
New York." 11 [Our italics].
This latter consideration bulks large in the New York law.
I incline to believe that it is inconsistent with some of the views
entertained by the Committee of the American Law Institute.
As I understand the report made to that body, it expressly neg-
atives the idea that a party may choose his domicil, using dom-
icil as a legal concept-once having established his home some-
where, the law automatically designates that "somewhere" as
his domicil. He chooses his home but the law alone determines
his domicil. Is it, then, possible for a party, who does in fact
have his home abroad but indicates unequivocally by his formal
declarations that he is domiciled in New York, thus to succeed
in having his property and succession governed by the New
York laws? 12 The Dzuputy case seems to me to go vely far in
the direction of allowing it.
The view propoznded to the Institutte is that the iztczt, which,
is one of the two necessary contstitzenits to create domicil, is 1zot
the intent to Mve a legal domicil but the iztezt to have a home.
The domicil is created by law, not by intent of the party, al-
though it is admitted that a man may take up his home where
he chooses for any reason which he may think desirable, such
as divorce, avoiding taxation, or otherwise. It is strongly argued
that he cannot actually live in one locality for his own comfort
and convenience and maintain, for instance, a wholly political
31 Ibid. 565.
12 See also Hegeman v. Fox, 31 Barb. 475 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 18C0); Hislop
v. Taaffe. 141 App. Div. 40, 125 N. Y. Supp. 614 (2d Dept. 1010) ; Jone3 v.
St. John, 30 Can. 122 (1899).
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residence in a place where he does not really desire to live,
although it is admitted that if he has two homes he may choose
one of them as his principal establishment. I incline to think
that there is in this a disposition to eindeavor to reduce the law
of domicil to too rigid and systematic a formulation, and that in
so doing we may not make the law any more certain. There is
a strong tendency in the courts of New York, as of England,
to refuse to hold a man domiciled abroad when he has evinced
his intention of retaining his American or English domicil of
origin despite the fact that his real home is abroad.
I do not think that the New York cases can be fitted com-
pletely into the home theory of Professor Beale much as I like
its simplicity and clarity. While the existence of a home is an
important evidentiary element in the ascertaining of a domicil,
I cannot agree with Professor Beale that as to the New York
law, at least, it is conclusive. In the Dupuy case the home was
clearly not in New York and yet the testatrix was held domiciled
there because of her intent not to abandon hed domicil there.1
Nor is this case an obsolete one. It is still, I think, the leading
case on the law of domicil in New York.
Counsel for the contestants in that case insisted that the law
would not permit the testatrix by mere intent to retain her dom-
icil of origin in defiance of the facts. "Recitals of domicile in a
deed or will and declarations thereof are not conclusive and may
be rebutted by proof that the actual domicile [home] was else-
where." This contention was negatived by the Court of Appeals
and it is the doctrine so negatived which appears to have been
adopted by the American Law Institute.
I think it quite true that a person cannot change his domicil
by removal to a new dwelling place without intention to make
the new dwelling place his home, but this statement does not
meet the really difficult situation. That situation arises where
a party does intend to make the new dwelling place his home,
but does not intend to abandon his domicil of origin which, be-
cause of sentimental or practical considerations, he formally in-
tends to retain.
A most interesting and leading case upon this point is
Matter of Newcomb.' 4 Mrs. Newcomb had long lived in New
York, as well as in New Jersey and elsewhere. After she was
some eighty years of age she began spending considerable time
in New Orleans, where she was interested because she had
founded there a memorial monument for her daughter. It is
evident that she anticipated a contest over her will, in which
1 3The question of intention to retain a domicil as contra-distinguished
from a home appears to be a predominant consideration in the case of
De ieli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996 (1890).
14192 N. Y. 238, 84 N. E. 950 (1908).
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the question of domicil would play an important r~le. In 1898,
knowing that she had declared herself a resident of New Jersey
in civil documents and acting under advice of counsel, she exe-
cuted several formal declarations, in one of which she said: 17
"I have now concluded to make my permanent home here,
because on each succeeding day of my life now drawing to a
close, I am the grateful witness of the successful development
and steady growth of this noble institution [referring to the
Memorial College], which now engrosses my thoughts and pur-
poses and is endeared to me by such hallowed associations. In
order that there vwzy be no occasion for gzisapprehezsion hAre-
after, especially in any matter tozchhing the settlemc-nt of my
estate, I desire to have it k2own by mny particzlar friends that
I have elected to mwke the city of New Orleazs my place of
domicile and permanent home, although of course I may occa-
sionally visit or reside in other places."
It appears that during the four years preceding this decla-
ration she spent upwards of 500 days in New Orleans, as com-
pared with less than 150 in New York City. Between the date
of the declaration and the date of her death she spent less than
200 days in New Orleans and more than 600 in New York City,
dividing the rest of the time between summer resorts in New
York State, where she had once admittedly been domiciled, and
New England. The court held that such declarations were ad-
missible as evidentiary of the intent of the testatrLx as to domicil.
The necessity for a single domicil as contra-distinguished from
a mere residence was clearly set forth in the admirable opinion
by Judge Vann: 16
"As domicile and residence are usually in the same place, they
are frequently used, even in our statutes, as if they had the same
meaning, but they are not identical terms, for a person may
have two places of residence, as in the city and country, but
only one domicile. Residence means living in a particular lo-
cality, but domicile means living in that locality with intent to
make it a fixed and permanent home. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile ..
"Residence is necessary, for there can be no domicile without
it, and important as evidence, for it bears strongly upon inten-
tion, but not controlling, for unless combined with intention it
cannot effect a change of domicile."
It will be noted that in this case and throughout the cases
generally, domicil is often used in the sense of "home" and not
in the strictly technical sense as a term indicating a legal rela-
1S Ibid. 247, 84 N. E. at 953.
26 Ibid. 250, 84 N. E. at 954.
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tionship. The court emphasizes the fact that the whole question
is one of fact rather than of law, and that a person may effect
a change of domicil for any reason whatever: 17
"A change of domicile may be made through caprice, whim or
fancy, for business, health or pleasure, to secure a change of
climate, or a change of laws, or for any reason whatever, pro-
vided there is an absolute and fixed intention to abandon one
and acquire another and the acts of the person affected confirm
the intention. . . . No pretense or deception can be practiced,
for the intention must be honest, the action genuine and the evi-
dence to establish both, clear and convincing. The animus ma-
nendi must be actual with no animo revertendi."
It was permissible, therefore, for Mrs. Newcomb to make the
change,18
"because she preferred the people, the climate or the laws of
Louisiana to those of New York, or even because she wished
to have her will proved and her estate settled there. She could
accomplish nothing by merely pretending to change her dom-
icile, while really intending to retain it in New York. If she
had made the most formal declaration of intention for the pur-
pose of creating evidence of an apparent change, with no inten-
tion of making an actual change, it would have been a fraud
and of no effect."
While the opinion thus clearly formulated the general rule
that one cannot have a domicil without a real as distinguished
from a colorable home it is, nevertheless, probable that without
Mrs. Newcomb's declaration electing domicil in New Orleans,
the courts would have concluded that she was domiciled in New
York or New Jersey. Aside from her actual residence in New
York during the greater part of her life she expressed a wish
"to die in New York and be buried in Greenwood Cemetery."
I incline to believe that while, as the court says, it would be
impossible for a person to create a domicil without any basis
of residence by mere statements alone, nevertheless, a very lim-
ited residence, especially if it be in the state or country of origin,
is necessary in a case where one having another residence elects
to consider his domicil at the first residence.
It is a settled doctrine of the Conflict of Laws that a person
may elect, there being nothing in the law and public policy of
the forum to the contrary, to have his succession governed by
the rules of another system of law. This is called "voluntary
submission" or "autonomy of the will." It is recognized in the
state of New York by statute: 10
17 Ibid. 251, 84 N. E. at 954.
18 Ibid. 252, 84 N. E. at 955.
:19 N. Y. Decedent Estate Law, § 47.
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Whenever a decedent, being a citizen of the United
States . . . wherever resident, shall have declared in his will
and testament that he elects that such testamentary dispositions
shall be construed and regulated by the laws of this state, the
validity and effect of such disposition shall be determined by
such laws."
The very purpose of this statute was to enable New York
citizens long resident abroad to put a clause in their wills which
might obviate the necessity for protracted litigation over the
domiciliary question. As a matter of fact, I may say that the law
was suggested, prepared and pressed through the legislature by
a former very prominent judge of the Court of Appeals who was
concerned over the situation not infrequently arising regarding
non-domiciled residents of New York who left property in New
York State. While the New York courts have been careful,
in phrase at least, to adhere to the general principles of the
common law as laid down in England and as followed generally
in the United States as to domicil, they have gone very far in
sustaining a New York domicil where the testator had declared
his domicil there, even though the basis for his residence was
indeed slim.
As is well said in a note in the YALE LAW JOURNAL, comment-
ing upon a recent case of domicil: 20
"The advantage of a fixed rule for the acquisition of a domicil
of choice is that it gives a definite standard to the courts for a
large majority of cases. But the certainty is limited, and the
fixed rule has serious disadvantages. In cases with unusual
facts, it forces the court either to make decisions which are
socially undesirable, or in an effort to avoid such decisions,
while still doing lip-service to the fixed rule, to strain and dis-
tort the rule in order to reach a sound result."
The Supreme Court in Massachusetts, in 1840, had the candor
to declare 2' that "no exact definition can be given of domicil; it
depends on no one fact or combination of circustances, but
from the whole taken together it must be determined in each
particular case." This somewhat vague and pragmatic view,
while it may sound philosophical, appears to give little comfort
to the practitioner who is searching for some fixed criteria in
order that he may intelligently advise his client. It is defended,
however, by an acute and scholarly author, Professor W. W.
Cook, of Yale, on the following ground: 22
20 (1927) 36 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 403, 412.
21 Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Bletc. 242, 245 (Mass. 1840).
22 Cook; The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 457, 487.
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"This view does not lead to the discarding of all principles
and rules, bub quite the contrary. It demands them as tools
with which to work; as tools without which we cannot work
effectively. It does, however, make sure that they are used as
tools and are not perverted to an apparently mechanical use.
It points out that the use never can be really mechanical; that
the danger in continuing to deceive ourselves into believing
that we are merely 'applying' the old rule or principle to 'a new
case' by purely deductive reasoning lies in the fact that as the
real thought-process is thus obscured, we fail to realize that
our choice is really being guided by considerations of social and
economic policy or ethics, and so fail to take into consideration
all the relevant facts of life required for a wise decision."
I am inclined to think that this gives a pretty fair picture of
the judicial mental process in many of these domicil cases and
accords pretty well with the admirable analysis of that process
furnished us by Judge Cardozo:23
"Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and
the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex
of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make
the man, whether he be litigant or judge..... I do not doubt
the grandeur of the conception which lifts them into the realm
of pure reason, above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and
deflecting forces. None the less, if there is anything of reality
in my analysis of the judicial process, they do not stand aloof
on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the
cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do."
An interesting case may be found in a careful opinion by
the late Surrogate Thomas. 24 It involved the question of the
domicil of one Spencer who, having a New York domicil of
origin, had been brought up in France and lived ther6 the
greater part of his life. His social and intellectual interests
were all in France or Italy but he nevertheless adhered to his
Americanism and spoke and thought of himself as an American
citizen domiciled in New York. Despite the evidence of his
preference for living abroad, the surrogate held that he was
domiciled in New York. While he had described himself as a
resident of France in an affidavit made to avoid taxation, the
learned surrogate distinguished between such residence and
domicil, saying:
"The declarations of the decedent as to his residence being
in New York, made on registering in hotels, in legal writings,
in applications for passports and in other memoranda, with the
single exception of this one tax affidavit, agree in claiming resi-
dence in New York."
2 3 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss (1921) 167-8.
24 Matter of Spencer, N. Y. L. J. June 2, 1908 (not reported).
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Referring to his arrest in France the opinion says:
"He never ceased thereafter to speak harshly on all permis-
sible occasions of the French government and people, and izoth-
ing in the whole history of the incident would fustify an infer-
ence tlwt he ever entertained the slightest wish to submit his
estate and uffairs to Freich lasw as a person having his domicil
in France." [Italics ours].
It'is clear that the judgment in this case was based upon the
evident intent of the testator to retain not so much a home in
New York as his American citizenship with all that it con-
noted. In other words, he was one of those who wished to live
abroad but to retain all the rights, privileges and immunities
belonging to the law of his domicil of origin.
A recent and exceedingly notable instance of this very natural
judicial attitude in favor of domicil of origin, an attitude which
the practicing lawyer in advising his client must have in mind,
is found in the case of United States Trust Co. of Ncw York v.
Hart.2-  Here the testator was born in 1836 in Virginia, removed
with parents to New York in 1859, where he lived until 1880,
in the meantime making frequent trips abroad. From 1880,
after he had retired from business, lie spent most of his time in
Paris, where he had a luxurious home. He returned for short
trips to America, the last trip having been made in 1904, is
death occurring in 1912. In 1881 he married in London, but in
1883 he procured a judgment of divorce in New York. Prior to
1892 he adopted and brought up in his household in France a
young child who was one of the defendants in the action. He
adopted her according to the statutes of New York. While liv-
ing in Paris he became a member of the American colony, and
purchased a burial plot in the American cemetery, in which hewas
subsequently buried. He, however, kept his property in New
York, his will was in the English language, and in documents
generally he described himself as of New York. He never re-
nounced his citizenship nor took any steps to become a citizen of
France. He had no physical residence in Nev York, save so
far as membership in a club might be so considered. His in-
terests, aside from financial, were wholly in France and one of
the parties making claims in regard to his succession was a lady
who had long occupied a prouxorial position in his household.
It would indeed seem very clear upon the facts in this case
that Hart had but one home and that home was in Paris. In
New York he had nothing in the physical and material sense
of the word that would be considered a home, at least for a man
of his position and manner of living. He was an American and
25150 App. Div. 413, 135 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1912); af'd without substan-
tial modification, 208 N. Y. 617, 102 N. E. 1115 (1913).
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retained his citizenship; he desired to have his property gov-
erned by the New York law and he kept his investments in the
city of New York. He spent his time in France in which he
maintained an establishment with every regular or other inci-
dent which might be connected with a permanent home. It is,
indeed, going far to say, as we must if we follow the general
principles as laid down in the law of domicil, that he had two
homes and that he merely, by his volition, elected which one he
desired to have considered as his domicil.
This is not a case of a man having a country and a city home
and electing to treat the one as the home and the other as a
residence. In such event, both residences have at all times the
characteristics of home; he but leaves one temporarily, intend-
ing to return to it, and lives in a precisely similar fashion in the
second as he lived in the first home. Throughout the year his
thoughts may turn to either residence as his home, yet he must
be regarded as still actually at home in both residences as dis-
tinguished from legally domiciled in both. I do not see how
this principle could be fairly determinative of the Hart case
where there was no factual foundation upon which to pred-
icate the existence of tvo homes. Thi Appellate Division found,
however, that his retention of citizenship and of his investments
in New York, together with his continuous declarations that he
was domiciled in New York were inconsistent with an intention
to change his domicil from New York to Paris.
It is thus clear that the New York courts, in common with the
English courts, require more evidence in order to find a man has
changed his domicil of origin than is necessary for the chang-
ing of a domicil of choice. It has been stated that the Ameri-
can cases do not treat domicil of origin differently from domicil
of choice. This may well be true of some of the cases through-
out the United States cited to sustain this proposition, but I chal-
lenge it so far as New York is concerned. The New York cases
have cited the English cases on this point and have, I think,
strictly followed their doctrine.
In the Hart case the opinion of the court, in sustaining the
New York domicil, marshals the'various declarations of the
decedent throughout his sojourn in Paris, in all of which he
declares himself as of New York, and concludes as follows: 20
"It would serve no useful purpose to review at length here
the evidence offered as to his oral declarations or declarations
written to friends as to his interest in the United States and its
affairs, or statgments to his friends in Paris as to his enjoying
Parisian life and his love for its laws in preference to those of
the United States, and that he intended to always live there.
The fact is that in every formal act of his life, so far as
appears, where it became necessan for him to state his dom-
26 Ibid. 418, 135 N. Y. Supp. at 85.
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icil, he invariably claiined it as the State of New York a.nd not
France. [Our italics].
"Unless one's domicil can be changed for him, without his
intention, or in spite of his intention, he must be considered,
at the time of his death, as domiciled in the State of New York."
While there can be no doubt whatever that Hart never in-
tended to change his domicil, it seems to me equally clear that
he did actually change his home. If I am right in this, the
general principles usually laid down by the American courts do
not really solve a problem of this kind. Where a person, after
having had an unquestioned domicil in New York, later actually
establishes his home abroad but continues to Lave business rela-
tions with New York and claims New York as his domicil in all
formal documents, the precedents clearly indicate that New York
courts will consider him as still domiciled in the state of New
York. Although the New York courts, like the English courts,
have repudiated the confounding of domicil with nation-
ality, they continue to be very reluctant to deny to an undoubted
American citizen the privilege of being governed by his own law
and will seize upon the most exiguous evidence of colorable resi-
dence in order to effect his formal intent to retain a domicil in
New York. The Ha rt case, which was bitterly contested and very
completely argued through to the Court of Appeals, seems ad-
mirably to illustrate this judicial attitude.
An attempt was made in 1863 by Lord Cranworth in the House
of Lords 27 to formulate this theory. According to the doctrine
as propounded by him, a domicil of choice is not acquired by any
residence, however preponderant and however permanent, un-
less the person in question has the intention of subjecting him-
self and his movable succession to the law of that country, or
at least, if he does not think expressly of the law, he has the
intention of so incorporating himself with the population of that
country that the application of its law to him and to his movable
succession must be considered to be in accordance with his
feelings. This doctrine was termed by Lord Cranworth as "the
modern, improved view of domicil."
This dictum of Lord Cranworth has given rise to much dis-
cussion both in the courts and among legal writers in England.
Some of Cranworth's expressions, such as quatc2zus in illo extere
patiiam have been entirely repudiated. Lord Westbury, in the
famous case of Udny v. Udny,2 distinguished between the polit-
ical status "by virtue of which each individual becomes the sub-
ject of some particular country binding him by the tie of na-
tional allegiance" and the civil status "by virtue of which he
27 Moorhouse v. Lord, 10 H. L. Cas. 272 (1863).
28 (1869) L. R. 1 H. L. [Sc.] 441.
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is possessed of certain municipal rights subject to certain obli-
gations." Since that time, the distinction between the civil
status dependent upon domicil and the public status of allegiance
dependent upon nationality has been maintained by the English
courts.
The present result of the English cases, according to West-
lake, is as follows: 29
"The animus required for acquiring a domicile of choice
must be an intention, either formed by the de cujus or which it
may be believed that he would have formed if his thoughts had
been crystalised by a question put to him, to reside in the fullest
and most permanent way, and in that sense to acquire a new
domicile, but it need not be an intention to subject himself
to another system of law, or to identify himself with the social
ideas and habits of another country."
A case which is very much in accord with the line of reasoning
followed in the New York cases referred to is that of Winans v.
Attorney General.30 Winans, although of American origin, had
had his home in England for a great many years and the lower
courts had held him domiciled there, but this decision was re-
versed on appeal on the ground that: 31
"'What has here to be considered . . . is whether the tes-
tator . . . ever actually declared a final and deliberate intention
of settling in England, or whether his conduct and declarations
lead to the belief that he would have declared such an intention
if the necessity of making the election between the countries had
arisen.'"
While there was no mention of the question of political alle-
giance or reference to Lord Cranworth's dictum, it seems to
me that the doctrine of the Winans case was fundamentally like
that of Moorhouse v. Lord 3 2 to the effect that a change of dom-
icil could not be effected as against the wishes and declarations
of a person who desired to retain his domicil of origin.
I incline to think that the disposition shown by the court in
Mooihouse v. Lord is one that will always actuate our courts
when a similar situation arises.3 3 Such a situation can not be
governed by a nice balancing for the purpose of discovering
which of two real homes a testator elected to treat as his domicil,
but if a testator who has one actual home has maintained any
29 WESTLAXE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1912) 362.
30 [1904] A. C. 287.
31 [1904] A. C. 287, 292.
32Supra note 27.
33 See McDonald v. Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn. 169, 132 AtI. 902
(1926).
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semblance of a residence in the state of his origin and national-
ity, even though it be merely a right of membership in a club,
the court will hold him domiciled here, if such has been his
intention. In other words, certain sentimental considerations
which have not yet been to my mind adequately, and perhaps can
not be completely adequately formulated, will be the prepon-
derant factor in the minds of the judges. This perhaps sub-
conscious judicial process will prevent the denationalization of
an American who, however much he enjoys being at home in
Europe, desires that his sentimental, business and legal connec-
tion with his native land remain intact.
